We initiate a study of the security of cryptographic primitives in the presence of efficient tampering attacks to the randomness of honest parties. More precisely, we consider p-tampering attackers that may efficiently tamper with each bit of the honest parties' random tape with probability p, but have to do so in an "online" fashion. Our main result is a strong negative result: We show that any secure encryption scheme, bit commitment scheme, or zero-knowledge protocol can be "broken" with advantage ( p) by a p-tampering attacker. The core of this result is a new algorithm for biasing the output of bounded-value functions, which may be of independent interest. We also show that this result cannot be extended to primitives such as signature schemes and identification protocols: assuming the existence of one-way functions, such primitives can be made resilient to ( 1 /poly(n))-tampering attacks where n is the security parameter.
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Introduction
A traditional assumption in cryptography is that the only way for an attacker to gather or control information is by receiving and sending messages to honest parties. In particular, it is assumed that the attacker may not access the internal states of honest parties. However, such assumptions on the attacker-which we refer to as physical assumptions-are quite strong (and even unrealistic). In real-life, an attacker may through a "physical attack" learn some "leakage" about the honest parties' internal states and may even tamper with their internal states. For instance, a computer virus may (e.g., using a, so-called, buffer overflow attack [3, 20, 38] ) be able to bias the randomness of an infected computer. Understanding to what extents the traditional physical assumptions can be relaxed, to capture such realistic attacks, is of fundamental importance.
Indeed, in recent years leakage-resilient cryptography-that is, the design of cryptographic schemes and protocols that remain secure even when the attacker may receive (partial) leakage about the internal state of the honest parties-has received significant attention (see e.g., [1, 5, 11, 12, 15, 17, 24, 32, 36, 37, 39] ).
In this work, we focus on understanding the power of tampering attacks-that is, attacks where the adversary may partially modify (i.e., tamper with) the internal state of honest parties. Early results in the 1990's already demonstrate that tampering attacks may be very powerful: by just slightly tampering with the computation of specific implementations of some cryptographic schemes (e.g., natural implementations of RSA encryption [40] ), Boneh et al. [4] demonstrated that the security of these schemes can be broken completely.
Previous works on tamper-resilient cryptography consider tampering of computation [2, 4, 8, 19, 28, 36] and tampering with the memory of an honest party who holds a secret (e.g., a signing or a decryption algorithm) [10, 16, 21, 30, 35, 36] . This line of research culminated in strong compilers turning any polynomial-size circuit C into a new "tamper-resilient" polynomial-size circuit C ; tamper-resilience here means that having "grey-box" access to C (i.e., having black-box access while tampering with the computation of C ) yields no more "knowledge" than simply having black-box access to C. These works, thus, show how to keep a secret hidden from a tampering attacker. Our focus here is somewhat different. In analogy with recent work of leakage-resilient security, we aim to investigate to what extent a tampering attacker may violate the security of a cryptographic protocol by tampering with the internal state of honest parities.
For concreteness, let us focus on the security of public-key encryption schemes (but as we shall see shortly, our investigation applies to many more cryptographic tasks such as zero-knowledge proofs and secure computation). Roughly speaking, we require a tamper-resilient encryption scheme to guarantee that ciphertexts conceal the encrypted messages, even if the internal computation of the sender (of the ciphertext) has been tampered with. 1 As first observation note that if the attacker may completely change the computation of the sender, he could simply make the sender send the message in the clear. Thus, to hope for any reasonable notion of tamper-resilient security we need to restrict the attacker's ability to tamper with the computation.
Tampering with Randomness Among various computational resources, randomness might be one of the hardest to protect against tampering. This is due to the fact that randomness is usually generated (perhaps based on some "physical" resources available to the system) and any malicious attacker who is able to change the bits along their generation can mount a tampering attack against the randomness. Indeed given the breakthrough results of [25, 33, 34] it is becoming even more clear that randomness is one of the most vulnerable aspects of a cryptographic system. Thus, a very basic question is to what extent we can protect our systems against tampering with randomness. In this work we initiate a formal study of this question by considering tampering attacks to the randomness of the honest players; namely we study the following basic question:
Can security of cryptographic primitives be preserved under tampering attacks to the randomness of honest parties?
Note that we need to restrict the tampering ability of the attacker, for otherwise the adversary can effectively make the scheme deterministic by always fixing the randomness of the honest parties to all zeros. But it is well-known that deterministic encryption schemes cannot be semantically secure. Therefore, here we initiate study of the power of weak types of tampering attacks to the randomness of the honest parties.
General Model: The Tampering Virus
We envision the adversary as consisting of two separate entities: (1) a classical attacker who interacts with the honest parties only by sending/receiving messages to/from them (without any side-channels), and (2) a tampering circuit (a.k.a. the "virus") who observes the internal state of the honest parties and may only tamper with their randomness (but may not communicate with the outside world, and in particular with the classical attacker). The tampering circuit only gets to tamper with a small fraction of the random bits, and in an efficient manner. Note that this model excludes a scenario in which the virus (even efficiently) samples the whole randomness, regardless of the original randomness sampled by the system, because in this cases all of the sampled tampered bits might be different from the system's original random seed. However, here we study weak attackers who only tamper with a small fraction of the random bits. In fact, previous works on resettable cryptography [9] can be interpreted as achieving tamper resilience against adversaries who tamper with all of the randomness of the honest parties by resampling the randomness of the honest parties and executing them again and again. This is incomparable to our model, since our adversary does not have control over the honest parties' execution (to run them again), but is more powerful in that it could change the value of some of the random bits.
Online Tampering Let 0 < p < 1 be the parameter describing the "power" of adversary (which defines the fraction of tampered bits). It still remains to clarify how the tampering is done over these bits. The first naive model would allow the adversary to tamper with a p fraction of the bits after all the bits are sampled by the system (and, thus, are known to the virus as well). However, this is not realistic since the sequence of random bits used by the system could always be sampled in an online manner; namely, the system could sample the ith random bit whenever it needs it and might use it "on the fly". Therefore, a tampering adversary also needs to tamper with them one-by-one, efficiently, and in an on-line fashion.
More precisely, we consider a so-called p-tampering attack, where the adversary gets to tamper with the random tape of the honest players as follows. The randomness of honest parties is generated bit-by-bit, and for each generated bit x i the efficient tampering circuit gets to tamper with it with independent probability p having only knowledge of previously generated random bits x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x i−1 (but not the value of the random bits tossed in the future). Roughly speaking, requiring security with respect to p-tampering attacks amounts to requiring that security holds even if the honest players' randomness comes from a computationally efficient analog of a SanthaVazirani (SV) source [42] . Recall that a random variable X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) over bit strings is an SV source with parameter δ if for every i ∈ [n] and every (x 1 , . . . , x i ) ∈ {0, 1} i , it holds that δ ≤ P[X i = x i |X 1 = x 1 , . . . , X i−1 = x i−1 ] ≤ 1 − δ. It is easy to see that the random variable resulting from performing a p-tampering attack on a uniform n-bit string is an SV source with parameter (1 − p)/2; in fact, any SV source is equivalent to performing a computationally unbounded p-tampering attack on a uniform n-bit string.
The main focus of this work is on the following question:
Can security be achieved under p-tampering attacks?
Our Results
Our main result is a strong negative answer to the question above for a variety of basic cryptographic primitives. A p-tampering attacker can break all of the following with advantage ( p): (1) the security of any CPA-secure (public-key or private-key) encryption scheme, (2) the zero-knowledge property of any efficient-prover proof (or argument) system for nontrivial languages, (3) the hiding property of any commitment scheme, and (4) the security of any protocol for computing a "nontrivial" finite function. More formally, we prove the following theorems.
Theorem 1.1 (Impossibility of Encryption) Let be any CPA-secure public-key or private-key encryption scheme. Then a p-tampering attacker can break the security of with advantage ( p). Moreover, the attacker only tampers with the random bits of the encryption (not the key-generation) without knowing the encrypted message.

Theorem 1.2 (Impossibility of Zero-Knowledge) Let (P, V ) be an efficient prover proof/argument system for a language L ∈ NP such that the view of any p-tampering verifier can be simulated by an efficient simulator with indistinguishability gap o( p), then the language L is in BPP.
Theorem 1.3 (Impossibility of Commitments) Let (S, R) be a bit-commitment scheme. Then, either an efficient malicious sender can break the biding with advantage ( p) (without tampering), or an efficient malicious p-tampering receiver can break the hiding with advantage ( p).
Following [21] we consider two-party functions f : D 1 × D 2 → R where only one player gets the output. A function f is called trivial in this context, if there is a deterministic single-message (i.e., only one player speaks) protocol for computing f that is information theoretically secure.
Theorem 1.4 (Impossibility of Secure Computation) The security of any protocol for computing a two-party non-trivial function can be broken with advantage ( p) through a p-tampering attack.
Positive Results We complement the above negative results by demonstrating some initial positive results: Assuming the existence of one-way functions, for any p = n −α , where α > 0 is a constant and n is the security parameter, every implementation of signature schemes, identification protocols, and witness hiding protocols can be made resilient against p-tampering attackers. We also present a relaxed notion of semantic security for encryption schemes that can be achieved under n −α -tampering attacks. We show that for these primitives, security holds even if the randomness source "minentropy loss" of at most O(log n). We next show how to use PRGs to ensure that a tampering attacker will only be able to decrease the overall (pseudo) min-entropy by O(log n). The above mentioned primitives already imply the existence of oneway functions [27] , thus preventing against n −α -tampering attacks can be achieved for these primitives unconditionally. Finally, we present positive results for tamperresilient key-agreement and secure multi-party computation in the presence of (at least) two honest players. We provide the details on this in Sect. 6.
Related Work
Subliminal Channels and Kleptography Cryptographic research on "subliminal channels" [41] and the related field of "kleptography" [43] study whether a cryptographic scheme can be "misused" for a purpose other than the original purpose it was designed for (e.g., by putting an undetectable trapdoor in the systems). The existence of subliminal channels between "outside" and "inside" adversaries could be a huge security concern in certain scenarios such as voting schemes [18] . Our Theorem 1.1 shows that any efficient encryption scheme always has a subliminal channel between an outsider adversary and an insider virus who is (only) able to tamper with the randomness of the encryption device no matter how the encryption algorithm tries to "detect" a virus who is signaling a bit of information to the adversary.
Undetectablity and Algorithm Substitution Attacks
As discussed above, our tampering attacks are undetectable in the sense that they would pass any extra check done over the randomness, as part of scheme, as long as these extra checks do not harm the completeness of the scheme. Perhaps surprisingly, our tampering attack could be set to remain perfectly undetachable in the sense that it generates a tampered random seed which is uniformly distributed, just like the original un-tampered randomness. As a result, the behavior of the algorithm using the tampered random seed remains identical to the when no attack occurs. More formally, we present tampering attacks against randomness of encryption, commitment, and secure computation schemes, breaking them with advantage 1/ poly(n) by tampering with only one bit of randomness that keeps the distribution of the tampered bits uniformly distributed (see Remark 5.11.) The beautiful work of Bellare et al. [7] studies algorithm substitution attacks against symmetric key encryption schemes in which the "big brother" substitutes the encryp-tion algorithm E (that is assumed to contain the encryption key) with its own variant E with the goal of learning nontrivial information about the encrypted message M through accessing to the ciphertext (encrypted by E ) transmitted over the public channel. [7] presented attacks against specific popular encryption schemes. Our tampering attacks against symmetric encryption schemes could be interpreted as algorithm substitution attacks in which the new substituted encryption algorithm is the affected encryption algorithm by adversary's virus that tampers with its randomness. Using our completely undetectable tampering attack, we could obtain algorithm substitution attacks against any semantically secure encryption scheme.
Tampering with Randomness vs. Imperfect Randomness Our negative results are closely related to the impossibility result of Dodis et al. [14] on the "impossibility of cryptography with imperfect randomness", where the security of cryptographic primitives are analyzed assuming that the honest parties only have access to randomness coming from an SV source (as opposed to the randomness being perfectly uniform). [14] present several strong impossibility results for secure realizability of cryptography primitives in a setting where players only have access to such imperfect randomness. The SV sources they consider for their impossibility results, however, may not be efficiently computable.
The key-difference between tamper-resilient security in our setting and security with imperfect randomness is that we restrict to randomness sources that are efficiently sampled through an (online) p-tampering attack; thus achieving tamper-resilient security becomes easier than resilience to imperfect randomness. Note that even if one can efficiently sample from the sources employed by [14] , that still does not solve our main question, because by sampling fresh randomness for the system the adversary is indeed tampering with all of the random seed. As we discussed above, however, in such scenario the adversary can always fix the randomness to zero and so we are essentially down to the deterministic case. Another, perhaps less important difference, is that for primitives with simulation-based security, we allow the simulator to depend on the p-tampering attacker, whereas [14] the simulator must work for any randomness source; this further makes achieving tamper-resilient security easier than resilience to imperfect randomness.
Comparison with [29] The work of Kamara and Katz studies the security of privatekey encryption schemes in a related, but quite different model that also lets the adversary tamper with the randomness of the encryption. Indeed [29] allows a CPA attacker A to arbitrarily choose the randomness r of their CPA encrypting oracle, but their attacker A does not have any control over the randomness used to encrypt the actual challenge ciphertext. They showed how to achieve security in this model, while our result, prove in our model, is a negative one; thus the two models are incomparable. In particular, even though the tampering happens in the model of [29] , the adversary cannot make this tampering based on private data stored on the encrypting device. On the other hand, in our model, the only actual tampering attack is launched over the randomness used for encrypting the challenge ciphertext, while this randomness remains intact in [29] .
Preserving Secrets vs. Achieving Security Some of the previous works on tamperresilient cryptography focused on compiling a circuit C holding a secret into a new circuit C that hides the secret even if the attacker gets to tamper with the computation of C . In contrast, in this work we focus on whether one can preserve the security of cryptographic schemes under tampering attacks. The simulation property of tamperresilient compilers do not necessarily guarantee that if the sender algorithm is compiled into a "tamper-resilient" version, then the encryption scheme is tamper-resilient. This is due to the fact that the simulation property of those compilers only guarantee that an attacker cannot learn more from tampering with the sender strategy than it could have with black-box access to it. But in the case of encryption schemes, it is actually the input to the algorithm (i.e., the message to be encrypted) that we wish to hide (as opposed to some secret held by the algorithm). In the following, we review these related works in two categories: aiming resilience against tampering with memory and against tampering with the computation.
Tampering with Memory
The work of Gennaro et al. [21] was the first to formally study tamper resilience from an algorithmic (as opposed to a hardware-based) point of view. In their model they deal with a cryptographic algorithm G(s, x) holding a secret s that given an input x outputs some y (e.g., G could be a signing or a decryption algorithm). The adversary gets hold to a box running G and is allowed to perform tampering attacks over the "memory" of G that holds the secret state of G (which in particular includes the secret s). The adversary's goal is to break the security of G with respect to the original value of s (e.g., forge a signature). Gennaro et al. showed that any cryptographic protocol that can be "tested" for malfunctioning (e.g., a signature box can be publicly tested by verifying the signatures it produces) can be broken by an adversary that only performs "resetting" attacks over the bits of the secret state. The idea is to test the bits of s one by one. In ith step the adversary sets the bit s i of s to zero. Then if the newly tampered value of s passes the malfunctioning test (e.g., can be used to sign messages successfully), it means that an acceptable value for the first i bit of s is discovered; otherwise we set s i to one.
Gennaro et al. also present a positive result based on the assumption that there is a tamper proof component (e.g., some "circuitry") available. This way, a trusted party who generates the circuit of G would sign the original secret state of G and hardwire this signature together with the corresponding verification key into the tamper proof part of the code of G. The execution of G will always start by first testing the signature of its own secret state. If the signature verification passes it will use this state to run its algorithm, and otherwise it will "self-destruct". The work of Dziembowski et al. [16] extended the positive result of [21] and achieved information theoretic security for a more restricted class of tampering functions through introducing and constructing "non-malleable" codes. These codes, then, are used to encode and decode the internal secret state of G before and after using it (instead of self-destruct). The works of [30, 36] go beyond only tamper resilience by achieving also leakage resilience when both of tampering and leakage are performed only over the memory. Finally the work of Choiet al. [10] studies the tamper resilience in the context of universal composability and studies specific cryptographic algorithms against affine tampering functions.
Tampering with Computation Boneh et al. [4] showed that introducing minor random errors during the computation of some implementations of certain cryptographic schemes can be exploited by the adversary to a large extent and break the scheme completely. The result was rather shocking, since some natural implementations would completely break down by a single call along with a random tampering performed. Ishai et al. [28] took on the positive side and showed how to make a circuit that is already accessible by the adversary as an input-output functionality secure against being tampered with up to t wires in every input-output call. The security here means that the view of any such adversary can be simulated by a simulator who does not tamper with the circuit and only uses it as a black-box. Thus the compiler of [28] shows how to keep a key inside a circuit in a secure way against tampering (e.g., a decryption circuit, or a signing circuit). The tampering functions here are restricted in the following sense: they only choose a set of t wires, and for each of them decide whether to set them to zero or one, or to flip their values. Our positive results (see Sect. 6) , however, apply even to the case that the adversary can observe the whole internal state of the tampered algorithm, and choose the value of the tampered "random" bits based on that. The subsequent work of Faust et al. [19] followed the framework of [28] and extended their work to the setting that there is no fixed upper bound t on the number of tampered wires in each round of executing the tampered algorithm, but there is a constant probability δ > 0 that each wire that is chosen to be tampered with remains untampered.
Our Techniques
Our main technical contribution is the development of new methods for biasing Boolean, and more generally, bounded-value functions, using a p-tampering attack.
Biasing Bounded-Value Functions
Our first (negative) result proves an efficient version of the Santha-Vazirani theorem: Any balanced (or almost balanced) efficiently computable Boolean function f can be biased by ( p) through an efficient p-tampering attack.
Specifically, let U n denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n and let U Tam, p n denote the distribution obtained after performing a p-tampering attack on U n using a tampering algorithm Tam; more precisely, let U
. . , X n ) where with probability 1 − p, X i is a uniform random bit, and with probability p, X i = Tam(1 n , X 1 , . . . , X i−1 ). Theorem 1.5 (Biasing Boolean Functions: Warm-up) There exists an oracle machine Tam with input parameters n and ε < 1 that runs in time poly(n/ε) and for every n ∈ N and ε ∈ (0, 1), every Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {−1, 1}, and every
The tampering algorithm Tam is extremely simple and natural; it just greedily picks the bit that maximizes the bias at every step. More precisely, Tam
for both of b = 0 and b = 1 by sampling, and sets x i to the bit b with larger estimated expectation. Theorem 1.5 suffices for our impossibility result for tamper-resilient zeroknowledge. For all our remaining impossibility results, however, we need a more general version that also deals with bounded value functions f : {0, 1} n → [−1, 1]. Our main technical theorem provides such a result. 
Note that in Theorem 1.6 the dependence on the variance of f is necessary because f may be the constant function f (x) = 0, whereas for the case of balanced Boolean functions this clearly cannot happen. Let us also point out that we have not tried to optimize the constant 1/5, and indeed it seems that a more careful analysis could be used to bring it down since for small p the constant gets close to 1. The greedy algorithm does not work in the non-Boolean case anymore. The problem, roughly speaking, is that a greedy strategy will locally try to increase the expectation, but that might lead to choosing a wrong path. As a "counter-example" consider a function f such that: conditioned on x 1 = 0 f is a constant function ε, but conditioned on x 1 = 1, f is a Boolean function with average −ε. For such f , the greedy algorithm will set x 1 = 0 and achieves bias at most ε, while by choosing x 1 = 1 more bias could be achieved. To circumvent this problem we use a "mildly greedy" strategy: we take only one sample of f (·) by choosing x i , x i+1 , . . . , x n at random (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 are already fixed). Then, we keep the sampled x i with probability proportional to how much the output of f is close to our "desired value", and flip the value of x i otherwise.
More precisely, Tam(1 n , x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ) proceeds as follows:
) from a Boolean random variable with expectation y · x i . Namely, output x i with probability 1+y 2 , and −x i with probability 1−y 2 . Note that our mildly greedy strategy is even easier to implement than the greedy one: to tamper with each bit, it queries f only once.
Impossibility Results for Tamper-Resilient Cryptography
We employ the biasing algorithms of Theorems 1.5 and 1.6 to obtain our negative results using the following blue-print: We first prove a computational version of the "splitting lemma" of [14] (Lemma 1.7 below which follows from Corollary 3.2 in [14] ). Then we will use the same arguments as those of [14] to derive our impossibility results.
Then there is a SanthaVazirani source X with parameter 1/2−1/ poly(n) such that f 0 (X ) is computationally distinguishable from f 1 (X ).
We use our Theorem 1.6 to prove the following computational version of Lemma 1.7 which allows one to distinguish the functions f 0 , f 1 by tampering with their random input. 
Proof Outline We derive Lemma 1.8 from Theorem 1.6 as follows. We use Theorem 1.6 to bias the ) (with domain {−1, 0, +1}) towards 1 by a tampering circuit Tam. It is easy to see that if f is Boolean, doing this is equivalent to the goal of Lemma 1.8. We show that if one samples f from a family of pairwise independent Boolean functions, then the resulting function g f (·) has sufficient variance as needed by Theorem 1.6.
We use our Lemma 1.8 similar to the way Lemma 1.7 is employed in [14] to derive our impossibility results for tamper resilient: encryption schemes, commitments, and two-party secure function evaluation protocols. For all these primitives an adversary uses Lemma 1.8 to generate a tampering circuit Tam that later on lets him distinguish the corresponding challenges (generated using the tampered randomness) and break the security.
Zero-Knowledge Zero-knowledge proofs in the setting of [14] require a universal simulator that simultaneously handles a large class of imperfect randomness sources. We can also use our Lemma 1.8 to rule out such tamper-resilient zero-knowledge proofs. In the computational setting, however, it is the malicious verifier who generates the bad source of randomness, and so we shall allow the simulator to depend on the tampering circuit as well. Thus, the simulator in our setting has more power. This prevents us from being able to apply Lemma 1.8 directly.
We proceed in using the following high level outline. In the first step, we generalize a result by Goldreich and Oren [23] showing that non-trivial zero-knowledge protocols cannot have deterministic provers. Our generalization to [23] shows that non-trivial zero-knowledge protocols require having prover messages with min-entropy ω(log n). This means that the verifier can apply a (seeded) randomness extractor to the transcript and obtain one almost unbiased bit. In a second step, we show how to use (the proof of) Theorem 1.5 to tamper with the prover's randomness so as to signal bits of the witness to the verifier. This outline, however, oversimplifies: is it not the case that every non-trivial zeroknowledge protocol requires the prover messages to have min-entropy ω(log n); in fact, for some "easy" instances, the prover may not communicate at all. Rather, we demonstrate that an "instance-based" version of the min-entropy extension of the Goldreich and Oren [23] theorem holds, and using it we can prove that either the prover's messages have high min-entropy (and thus the witness can be leaked to the verifier), or the instance can be decided "trivially". It follows that in either case, we can correctly decide the instance and thus the language must be trivial.
Preliminaries
Notation We use x ← X to denote the sampling of x from the random variable (or rather distribution) X . By U n we refer to the uniform distribution over {0, 1} n . We use the notation that multiple uses of the same random variable in a probability or expectation refers to the same instantiation.
. On few occasions, to emphasize over the random variable over which the probability or expectation is defined, we might use the notation Pr x←X [·] or E x←X [·] . By a negligible function, denoted as negl(n), we mean any function which is of the form n −ω (1) . By a noticeable function f (n) we mean any function of the form n (1) . We use the notation PPT do denote probabilistic polynomial time. We might use the terms "efficient" and PPT interchangeably. For interactive algorithms (A, B) and C ∈ {A, B}, by View C A, B (x) we denote the view of C in an execution of the interaction between A, B, where this view includes the common input, the private randomness of C, and the messages exchanged. In addition, by A, B (x) we denote the output of the interaction between (randomized) interactive algorithms A, B over common input x. By (X, Y ) we denote the statistical distance between the random variables X, Y defined as 1 2
we denote the min-entropy of the random variable X defined as the largest k such that P[X = a] ≤ 2 −k for every a. We call a sequence {X x } of random variables indexed by x ∈ I ⊆ {0, 1} * an ensemble of random variables. We call two ensembles of random variables {X x } and {Y x } (with the same index set) α(|x|)-indistinguishable if for every polynomial p(·) and every sequence of Boolean circuits C n of size p(n),
we use the term computationally indistinguishable to refer to the case where 
It is easy to see that H ∞ (X ) ≥ n · lg(1 − δ) holds for any SV source X = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) with parameter δ.
Biasing Functions via Online Tampering
In this section we study how much the output of a bounded function can be biased through a tampering attack. First we formally define an online tampering process and a tampering source of randomness (as a result of an online tampering attack performed on a uniform source of randomness). where U i 1 denotes a uniformly random bit over {−1, 1}. In other words, with probability p, Tam gets to tamper the next bit with the knowledge of the previous bits (after the tampering) 2 . The tampering algorithm Tam might also receive an auxiliary input and use it in its tampering strategy. 3 We use U Tam, p n to denote the p-tampered source obtained by the above tampering process with tampering algorithm Tam.
Note that in the definition above, the tampering algorithm Tam might be completely oblivious to the parameter p. By referring to Tam as a p-tampering algorithm, we emphasize on the fact that Tam's algorithm might depend on p. [42] with parameter δ = (1 − p)/2. In fact, it is not hard to see that without the efficiency consideration, the two notions are equivalent.
Remark 3.2 Every p-tampering source is also a Santha-Vazirani source
Preliminaries: Calculating the Effect of a Single Variable
Since the constants that emerge in our analysis are standard Fourier notation, in the following we will first recall the Fourier notation before using it in our presentation of the proofs. However, we emphasize that no knowledge of Fourier analysis is needed for understanding our proofs.
Recall that the Fourier coefficients of any function f :
For every prefix
We note that the variables of f x ≤i are named (x i+1 , . . . , x n ) and thus the Fourier coefficients of f x ≤i aref x ≤i (S)'s with S ⊆ {i + 1, . . . , n}. The following basic identity can be proved by straightforward calculation.f
( 1) Recall thatf (∅) andf x 1 (∅) are simply expectations. One interpretation of the above identity is that ±f ({1}) is the change of expectation when we set x 1 = ±1. This is thus useful for analyzing the bias introduced as the result of a tampering attack. Using the above identity with a simple induction, we can express f (x) as a sum of Fourier coefficients of restrictions of f . Namely, f (x) equals to the expectationf (∅) plus the changes in expectation when we set x i bit by bit. (1)) and a simple induction on j it follows that:
Lemma 3.3 For every x
which proves the lemma.
As a corollary, the above lemma implies that the sum of Fourier coefficients (of restrictions of f ) in absolute value is at least | f (x)| − |f (∅)|.
Corollary 3.4 For every x
where both inequalities follow by the triangle inequality, and the second equality uses Lemma 3.3.
The Boolean Case
A seminal result by Santha and Vazirani [42] shows that for every balanced Boolean function f (e.g., a candidate "extractor"), there exists a p-tampering source X that biases the output of f by at least p. We now present a strengthening of this result that additionally shows that if the function f is efficiently computable, then the source X could be an efficient p-tampering one (and only needs to use f as a black box). In the language of extractors, our result thus proves a strong impossibility result for deterministic randomness extraction from "efficient" Santha-Vazirani sources. Our proof of the generalized result is quite different (and in our eyes simpler) than classic proofs of the Santha-Vazirani theorem and may be of independent interest.
In fact, we present two different proofs. The first one achieves optimal bias p for balanced f , whereas the second uses an extremely simple "lazy greedy" tampering algorithm that makes only a single query to f and achieves bias p/3 for balanced f . Theorem 1.5 (Restated) (Biasing Boolean Functions: Warm-up) There exists an oracle machine Tam with input parameters n and ε < 1 that runs in time poly(n/ε) and for every n ∈ N and ε ∈ (0, 1), every Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {−1, 1}, and
Proof of Theorem 1.5 Let us first present a proof with an inefficient tampering algorithm achieving bias p · (1 − |μ|); next, we show how to make it efficient while not loosing much in bias. On input 
Since Tam tampers with the i'th bit with independent probability p, therefore
and so it holds that
where the last inequality follows by Corollary 3.4.
Note that the above tampering algorithm Tam in general is not efficient since computingf x ≤i−1 ({i}) exactly may be hard. However, we show that Tam may approximate
ε 2 · log n ε ) samples, and set x i according to the sign of the approximation off x ≤i−1 ({i}), while still inducing essentially the same bias. This clearly can be done efficiently given oracle access to f . As before, let X = U Tam f , p n denote the corresponding p-tampering source. To lower bound E[ f (X )], we note that the only difference from the previous case is that Tam(1 n , x ≤i−1 ) is no longer always outputting sgn(f x ≤i−1 ({i}) ) . Nevertheless, we claim that for every x <i it holds that 
then follows by the same analysis as before.
Before presenting the second proof, we state the following lemma, which follows similarly to Lemma 3.3, but instead it relies on a squared version of Eq. (1).
Lemma 3.5 For every x
Proof Squaring Eq. (1), and recalling that x 2 i = 1 since x i ∈ {−1, 1}, for every f we obtainf
By expandinĝ
and using a simple induction over j it follows that
We continue to present the second proof, which uses a "lazy greedy" tampering algorithm that makes only a single query to f and achieves bias p/3 for balanced f .
Theorem 3.6
There exists an oracle machine Tam that makes a single query to its oracle such that for every n ∈ N , every Boolean function f : {0, 1} n → {−1, 1}, and
Proof We consider a lazy greedy tampering algorithm LTam that on input 
Claim 3.7 For every
where the second expectation is over the choice of
To analyze LTam, we derive two equalities analogous to that in the proof of Theorem 1.5, and the theorem follows by combining the two equalities. First, since LTam gets to tamper with bit i with independent probability p and
Similarly, by applying Lemma 3.5 and the linearity of expectations, we have
Simplifying using the fact that f is Boolean, the trivial bound
Plugging Eq. (3) in Eq. (2) yields
which completes the proof of Theorem 3.6.
Tampering with Bounded-Value Functions-The General Case
We further consider the more general case of tampering non-Boolean, bounded-value functions. We present an efficient tampering algorithm that biases the expectation of the function by an amount linear in the variance of the function. , and every p < 1,
We prove Theorem 1.5 using lazy greedy tampering algorithm again. As before, we let LTam take a single sample, and make decision based on the outcome of the sample, but since f is not Boolean, we make randomized decision based on the function value on the sample. Specifically, on input x ≤i−1 = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 ):
• LTam outputs X i = x i with probability (1 + y)/2, and X i = −x i with probability
The following claim says that LTam "implicitly plays the first Fourier coefficient" in expectation.
Claim 3.8 For every
Proof Let X i = LTam(x ≤i−1 ). We have:
where the second expectation is over the choice of 2 ], and then derive a lower bound on E[ f (X )] by combining the two. The two inequalities are stated in the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.10
We first use the above two lemmas to show that
For the case that
which together with Lemma 3.9 implies that
Now we prove Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10. The proof of Lemma 3.9 is a generalization of the analysis for biasing Boolean functions.
Proof of Lemma 3.9 By applying Lemma 3.3 and the linearity of expectations, we have
Since LTam gets to tamper with bit i with independent probability p and
Simplifying using the trivial bound
The lemma follows by combining Eqs. (4) and (5):
where the last equality uses the fact thatf (∅) 2 
The proof of Lemma 3.10 is less trivial. Our key observation is the following useful property of the lazy greedy tampering algorithm LTam: consider the function f together with an arbitrary function g : {−1, 2 , but in the discussion that follows, g can be completely unrelated to f ). While intuitively we expect the expectation of f to be increasing after tampering, it is clearly possible that the tampering causes the expectation of g to decrease. Nevertheless, we show that for a properly defined potential function combining the expectations of f and g, the potential is guaranteed to be non-decreasing after tampering. Namely we prove the following lemma. 2 4 ,
Lemma 3.11 Let g
Proof We show that for every x ≤i−1 ∈ {−1,
To simplify the notation, let A =f
Using this notation we have,
Using Eq. (1), we see that
Recall that in the tampering process, with probability 1 − p, X i is uniformly random, and with probability p, X i = LTam(x ≤i−1 ) equals 1 with probability
A calculation shows that
Note that since g is bounded, we have |B| ≤ 1 and thus
. Applying the inequality iteratively shows that
Lemma 3.10 now follows easily.
Proof of Lemma 3.10 By applying Lemma 3.11 with g = f 2 and noting thatĝ(∅) = ν, we have
Tampering with One Bit
In this subsection we study the effects of applying the greedy biasing attack of Theorem 1.5 in a scenario in which the tampering circuit Tam gets to tamper with only one bit of the input bits where the location of the tampered bit is selected at random. Intuitively, this is similar to a p-tampering attack with p = 1/n where n is the number of input bits.
Theorem 3.12
There exists an oracle machine Tam running in time poly(n/ε) such that for every n ∈ N , every bounded-value function f : {0, 1} n → [−1, 1], and every p < 1,
where X is the result of Tam tampering with a single randomly selected bit of the input bits U n .
Proof We use the greedy tampering algorithm of Theorem 1.5. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1.5 we present a computationally unbounded tampering that achieves bias
This tampering attack could then be turned into an efficient one by using approximations of expectations while losing an additive ε term.
Recall that by Lemma 3.
, and thatf x ≤i−1 ({i}) is the the increase in the expectation when we set x i to be one.
Let j ∈ [n] be the randomly selected index of the tampered bit. Recall therefore we have
where x ≤ j−1 is the first i −1 bits of X . However, since the j'th bit is the only tampered bit, x ≤ j−1 is uniformly distributed. In the following we will show that
which is equivalent to
. The theorem then follows by linearity of expectations.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 1.5 it holds that
However, note that if 0 < α < 2 it holds that α ≥ α 2 /2, and therefore it holds that
Computational Splitting from Efficient Biasing
In this section we state and prove Lemma 1.8 formally.
The following definition formalizes the scenario in which one can distinguish between the functions f 0 , f 1 by a tampering circuit T that performs a p-tampering attack against the inputs of f 0 and f 1 and at the end one applies a Boolean function f over the generated output. T) is a distribution, we call them δ-distinguishing if the same holds but also over the randomness of ( f, T );
The definition above could be generalized beyond p-tampering attacks and can, e.g., be directly adapted for tampering attackers that tamper with a randomly selected bit only.
Remark 4.2
Note that in Definition 4.1 above, the tampering circuit T could be fully described independently of f 0 , f 1 , or it could be described as an oracle algorithm
However, when the circuit T receives the random bits U n , it does not know which one of f 0 , f 1 will be executed over the sequence of tampered bits. One can think of an alternative version of Definition 4.1 in which two tampering circuits T 0 , T 1 together with a detecting function f aim to distinguish f 0 from f 0 in which T 0 tampers with with the inputs of f 0 and T 1 tampers with the inputs of f 1 . Now we describe Lemma 1.8 formally. 
and let p < 1 be an arbitrary tampering parameter. There is a PPT A(κ, m) that only depends on κ, m and outputs a function f and a tampering oracle-aided circuit
T such that (f, T ( f 0 , f 1 ) ) δ-distinguish ( f 0 , f 1 ) where δ ≥ (ε · p − 2 −t/2 ). Moreover,
in case the tampering model allows T to tamper with only one randomly selected bit, then δ ≥ (ε/n − 2 −t/2 ), and the distribution of the sequence of input bits remains uniformly random even after the tampering (with one bit).
Remark 4.4 Note that the adversary of Lemma 4.3 generates the tampering oracleaided circuit T without the knowledge of the f 0 , f 1 , however, the circuit T will have access to both of these functions while tampering with the inputs. But the tampered randomness will be fed to f b for an unknown b ∈ {0, 1}. This setting is useful in scenarios in which the functions f 0 , f 1 are not known to the attacker during the generation of the tampering virus, but will be known during the tampering attack. An example is the tampering attack of Sect. 5 for private-key encryption schemes in which the functions f 0 , f 1 are the functions whose decryption depends on the private key and take randomness as input and encrypt, in order, b = 0 and b = 1.
In the rest of this section we will prove Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
We first prove the lemma for the case of p-tampering attacks and then will describe how to adapt it to the case of tampering with one randomly selected bit.
Notation In all cases below, when f is clear from the context, for b ∈ {0, 1} let
. When clear from the context, we use μ b to denote the expected value of f b (·) and μ to denote the expected value of g f (·) both under a tampering attack. Let ⊥ be a trivial tampering circuit that does not change the input. In the following, without loss of generality we will assume that p < 1/10. We will also use the notation
Let be an upper-bound on the length of f 0 ({0, 1} m ) and f 1 ({0, 1} m ) .
Description of A A will sample f ← F for a family of pairwise independent functions F mapping {0, 1} to {0, 1}, and then outputs tampering circuit T of Theorem 1.6 such that the p-tampering
Recall that T is an oracle algorithm that has access to f 0 and f 1 as subroutines and thus it could compute g f on any input of its choice. For sake of simplicity, in the following we will simply write T instead of T g f or T ( f 0 , f 1 ) .
In the rest of the proof we will prove the properties of the algorithm A as needed in Lemma 4.3. First observe that a p-tampering algorithm T that generates input distribution U ) which, in general, is not a Boolean function and takes values in {−1, 0, +1}.
Proof The proof follows by a simple application of the linearity of expectation:
Therefore, the goal of the tampering circuit T is to bias the bounded function g : {0, 1} m → {−1, 0, +1} towards 1. However, this is not possible in general because f 0 and f 1 could be the same (or almost the same) functions, in which case g f (·) is almost always zero. Here, we will use the fact that Pr 
Proof We have:
But note that whenever f 0 (r ) = f 1 (r ) it holds that P f ←F [ f 0 (r ) = f 1 (r )] = 0, and whenever f 0 (r ) = f 1 (r ) it holds that P f ←F [ f 0 (r ) = f 1 (r )] = 1/2 (due to the pairwise independence of f ← F). Therefore
In the following we will always assume that f is being sampled from the family of pairwise independent functions F described above.
. By the first property, with probability at least δ over the choice of r it holds that g(r ) ∈ {−1, 1}. We will use the following well-known fact followed by the left-over hash lemma. Note that the goal of A is to generate the tampering circuit T without the knowledge of f 0 , f 1 while, at the same time, this circuit T (which does access f 0 , f 1 in a blackbox way) will increase μ (i.e., the value of μ under a p-tampering attack). To do this we rely on the high entropy of the two sources and use the fact that for such sources (when we sample f ← F from a family of pairwise independent functions) f is always far from being a good distinguishing function for ( f 0 , f 1 ) (without tampering). The formal argument follows.
By Lemma 4.9 and an averaging argument, with probability 1 − O(2 −t/2 ) over the choice of f ← F, it holds that |μ| ≤ 2 −t/2 . Now suppose the sampled f is such that it leads to |μ| ≤ 2 −t/2 < 1. We call such f a good sampled function. Since we are assuming t ≥ 10 it follows that 2 −t/2 < 1/10, and so by Claim 4.8 we have
Claim 4.7 showed that E[val(F)] ≥ ε/5, and since there is O(2 −t/2 ) probability that the sampled f is not good, it follows that the sampled
Tampering with one randomly selected bit To prove Lemma 4.3 for the case of tampering with one randomly selected bit, all we have to do is to use the tampering algorithm of Theorem 3.12 rather than that of Theorem 1.6. The (ε/n − 2 −t/2 ) distinguishability advantage follows similarly to the proof for the case of p-tampering, but it still remains to show that the distribution of the tampered bits (despite being tampered with) remains uniform over {0, 1} n . The reason, roughly speaking, is that the tampering direction is also selected at random and that randomness depends on the selection of the pairwise independent function f . More formally, without loss of generality we assume that for every f ∈ F complement function (1 − f ) is also in F, and that these two functions are sampled with equal probabilities. 5 We also defer the selection of the function f to after selecting the index j ∈ [n] of the tampered with as well fixing as the randomness used by the tampering circuit T . The greedy tampering of Theorem 3.12 proceeds by approximating whether setting x i will increase or decrease the final expectation. It is easy to see that the decision by the tampering T would flip if we choose (1 − f ) instead of f . Therefore, the final distribution X after the tampering is as follows: a random index j is selected, then x j is tampered with a random value (depending on whether f or (1 − f ) is chosen). This way, the distribution of X remains uniformly random over {0, 1} n .
Impossibility of Tamper Resilient Cryptographic Primitives
In this section we show how to use Lemma 4.3 and the arguments given in [14] to derive impossibility results regarding tamper resilient encryption, commitments, secure two party computation, and zero-knowledge proofs.
Encryption
In this subsection we prove that no CPA secure (private-key or public-key) encryption scheme would remain secure in the presence of a tampering attack. For these applications we follow the way the "splitting lemma" (see Lemma 1.7) is employed in [14] but instead we use our computationally efficient version of this tool (i.e., our Lemma 4.3). We formalize and prove the result for the case of public-key encryption for which the tampering occurs only during the encryption. We then sketch the argument for the private-key setting. At the end we show that an almost identical proof holds for private-key encryption schemes as well. We start by formally defining the notion of tamper resilient encryption.
Definition 5.1
We call a public-key or private-key encryption scheme p-tamperresilient secure, if for every poly(n)-sized adversary Adv there exists a negligible function negl(n) such that for every sequence {(x n 0 = x n 1 )} n of pair of messages of equal (polynomial) length (i.e., |x n 0 | = |x n 1 | = poly(n)) Adv can win in the game below with probability at most 1/2 + negl(n) where n is the security parameter.
1. A pair of keys (sk, pk) are generated and Adv receives the public-key pk. In case the scheme is private-key, the adversary receives no key. 2. Adv generates a p-tampering circuit T and {x n 0 , x n 1 }. If the scheme is public-key, these choices can depend on the public key pk. 3. T acts on r E , the uniform randomness of the encryption, as a p-tampering circuit (see Definition 3.1) and transforms it into r T E . In case the scheme is private-key T also gets access to the private key. 6 
Let us make a few remarks regarding Definition 5.1 follow.
• We do not allow the adversary to tamper with the randomness of the key-generation phase. One reason is that key-generation is run only once and is easier to protect than the encryption phase which might be executed many times. Note that this restriction only makes our negative result stronger.
• We require the adversary to generate the tampering circuit without the knowledge of the exact selected message x b (even though this message finally will be present in the infected encrypting device). The reason is that the randomness r E may be generated ahead of time and the message gets selected afterwards. Again, this restriction only makes our impossibility result stronger.
Why accessing the secret key? Note that in Definition 5.1 we did not allow T to access the private key if the scheme is public-key, while we did allow T to access the private key if the scheme is private-key. This difference is justified since in a privatekey encryption scheme the private-key should be stored and used in the encrypting device, and thus could be accessed by the tampering circuit, while in a public-key encryption scheme this is not necessarily the case. Moreover, there are private-key encryption schemes that remain tamper-resilient (against tampering with encryption's randomness) if the tampering circuit does not access the private key. E.g., consider the following scheme in which the message space is M = {0, 1} m , the key length is k, and R is a PRG with a k-bit key, domain size n and image size m. To encrypt any message x, the encrypting algorithm chooses a random seed r ← {0, 1} n and takes Enc(key, x, r ) = (r, R key (r ) ⊕ x) where ⊕ is the bit-wise "exclusive or" operation. It is easy to see that (1) this scheme is multi-message secure, and (2) as long as
(as a result of p-tampering attack by T ) still has ω(log n) min-entropy and that suffices for multi-message security of the scheme under a p-tampering attack (to encryption).
One-message vs. multi-message security Note that if a private-key encryption scheme is 1-message secure (i.e., the encryption of all messages in the message space are indistinguishable) then one should not anticipate a similar attack to that of Theorem 5.2 to hold, simply because the one-time pad encryption has a deterministic encryption. However, as we will show below, if the private-key encryption scheme is even twomessage secure (i.e., the adversary proposes two pairs of messages and one pair gets encrypted message by message and is returned to him) then it should have enough randomness in its encryption phase to let a tampering attack (to the randomness of encryption) break its security.
The following is the formalized variant of Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 5.2 (No Tamper-Resilient Public-Key Encryption) Let be a CPA-secure public-key or private-key encryption scheme for message space {0, 1} and completeness 1−negl(n). For every p ≥ 1/ poly(n), there is an efficient p-tampering adversary that breaks (according to Definition 5.1) with advantage ( p) − negl(n).
Proof We will use Lemma 4.3. In the following let ek be the encryption key. This would be the public-key in case of public-key encryption and the secret (symmetric) key in the case of private-key encryption. According to Definition 5.1 the tampering circuit T generated by the adversary does have access to the encryption key ek, either because the scheme is public-key and pk is known by the adversary before generating pk, or that the scheme is private-key and the tampering circuit T gets to read sk during the tampering attack. Suppose the encryption randomness r E has m = poly(n) bits. Recall that the adversary Adv generates a tampering circuit T that tampers with the encryption randomness r E of the challenger and changes its distribution from U m into a p-tampering source U T, p m , receives the cipher text c that is encrypted under the tampered randomness, and it has to guess the index b of the encrypted message with probability 1/2 + ( p).
The adversary will use x n 0 = 0, x n 1 = 1 and wishes to distinguish between the two functions: f 0 (r ) = Enc ek (0, r ) and f 1 (r ) = Enc ek (0, r ). By the completeness of the encryption scheme, with overwhelming probability over the choice of ek, it holds that
We first prove that the encryptions of 0, 1 have enough min-entropy, and then we will apply Lemma 4.3 to derive the attack. Proof Suppose on the contrary that with probability 1/ poly(n) over the choice of the key key, there is a message b ∈ {0, 1} and a ciphertext c such that P[c b = c ] = 1/ poly(n). Then one can break the CPA security of with advantage ≥ 1/ poly(n) as follows. Given the challenge ciphertext c ← c b , the adversary obtains c 0 as a fresh encryption of 0, either by encrypting itself if the scheme is public-key, or by asking it to be encrypted if the scheme is CPA-secure. Then the adversary outputs outputs 0 iff c 0 = c.
The attack succeeds with advantage ≥ 1/ poly(n) because of the following. If the challenger chooses b = 1, then by the 1 − negl(n) completeness of , the probability that c 1 = c is only negl(n), and therefore the probability of adversary outputting 0 is negl(n). On the other hand, if the challenger chooses b = 1 (based on the assumption above) with probability 1/ poly(n) the two encryptions of zero equal to c . This means that the bit output by the adversary will indeed distinguish between the two encrypted bits.
Because of Lemma 5.3, the tampering adversary can use the attack of Lemma 4.3 for t = ω(n). Thus, the adversary is able to efficiently generate an efficient function f and an efficient tampering circuit T such that by using T in its tampering attack and outputting f (c) it will win in the security game of Definition 5.1 with probability 1/2 + ( p) − negl(n).
Tamper-Resilient Commitments and Secure Computation
In this section we use the argument used in [14] for the case of commitments holds (in the computational setting) also for a weaker variant of commitments which we call "semi-honest" commitments. Then we use the impossibility of tamper-resilient semihonest commitments to also rule out tamper-resilient secure two-party computation.
Suppose f is a two-input finite function, Alice holds an input x, Bob holds an input y and they want to jointly compute f (x, y) in a way that only Bob receives f (x, y). In this section we show that any such finite function is either trivial and has a deterministic secure protocol, or that any efficient protocol to compute f (x, y) is vulnerable to tampering attacks. We restrict ourselves to the case that only one party receives the output of f , and extending our result to the setting that both parties get outputs remains as an interesting open question.
We use the following semi-honest (weak) definition for the security of SFE protocols. This makes our negative result only stronger.
Definition 5.4 ((Weak) Semi-Honest SFE)
Suppose is a two-party protocol in which Alice and Bob receive 1 n as common input, Alice gets input x ∈ X and Bob gets input y ∈ Y. We call a secure function to compute a two-input function f with input sets X and Y if the following hold:
• At the end of the interaction Bob receives f (x, y) with probability 1 − negl(n).
• For any pair of inputs for Bob y 1 = y 2 ∈ Y and input x for Alice, if Bob uses y b for a random b ∈ {0, 1} to interact with Alice who uses x, after an honest execution, Alice cannot guess b with probability more than 1/2 + negl(n).
• For any pair of inputs x 1 = x 2 for Alice and y for Bob, if f (x 1 , y) = f (x 2 , y), at the end of the interaction, an honest execution of Bob using y cannot guess with probability more than 1/2 + negl(n) the randomly chosen input of Alice x b .
Definition 5.5 (Tamper-Resilient (Weak) Semi-Honest SFE)
We call a secure protocol for f against p-tampering adversaries, if the conditions stated in Definition 5.4 hold even if the party (e.g., Alice) who tries to guess the randomly chosen input of the other party (e.g., Bob's input) is allowed to perform a p-tampering attack along the execution of the protocol. Namely, if Alice generates a tampering circuit Tam which transforms the uniform randomness of Bob into U Tam poly(n) and then interacts with Bob, she still should not be able to guess Bob's input which is chosen as y ← {y 1 , y 2 } with probability more than 1/2 + negl(n). The same holds if Bob tries to guess Alice's input x ← {x 1 , x 2 } when he uses an input y such that f (x 1 , y) = f (x 2 , y) even if he gets to perform a p-tampering attack over Alice's randomness.
Following [6] we say that f has an insecure minor if there are y 2 ) . It was shown in [6] that if f does not have an insecure minor, then there is a deterministic single message protocol to compute f which is secure even against malicious parties. Here we show that if f has an insecure minor, then it cannot have a tamper-resilient secure protocol.
Theorem 5.6 (Impossibility of Tamper-Resilient SFE) Suppose f is a two-input function with an insecure minor. Then for every p > 1/ poly(n), there is no protocol to compute f securely against p-tampering adversaries (according to Definition 5.5).
Proof Outline To prove Theorem 5.6, roughly speaking, we show that computing f can be interpreted as a weak form of commitment scheme that cannot be tamper-resilient. Here we show that the impossibility of tamper-resilient commitments applies even to a weak form of commitment schemes that is implied by any secure (asymmetric) SFE. Note that here we are not referring to a general black-box reduction from (our variant of weakly secure) commitments to secure SFE, since such transformations might not preserve tamper-resilience, but in fact our reduction is more direct in the sense that any attack to our weakly-secure commitment scheme can be transformed back to an attack against the SFE scheme.
Definition 5.7 (Semi-Honest Commitments) We call (S, R) a semi-honest bitcommitment if:
• Completeness Similar to standard commitments.
• Semi-Honest Hiding We call (S, R) (1 − ε) semi-honest hiding if an honest execution of R cannot guess a randomly chosen committed bit b by the end of the commitment phase with a probability more than ε. More formally, such receiver is modeled by R = (R 1 , R 2 ) where R 1 runs the receiver's protocol honestly and then R 2 receives the view of R 1 and outputs a the output of R. We simply call (S, R) semi-honest hiding if it is (1 − negl(n)) semi-honest hiding.
• Semi-Honest Binding We call (S, R) (1−ε) semi-honest binding, if the probability that (in an honest execution), the randomness r S is accepted as decommitment to both of {0, 1} is at most ε. Namely, with probability at least 1 − ε over the choice of (r S , r R ) it holds that τ (0, r S , r R ) = τ (1, r S , r R ) where τ (b, r S , r R ) is the transcript of the commitment phase. We call (S, R) simply semi-honest binding if it is (1 − negl(n)) semi-honest binding.
The following construction shows how to get a commitment scheme from any protocol that computes a function f with an insecure minor. We will show that if the protocol to compute f if semi-honest secure, then so is the commitment scheme.
Construction 5.8 Suppose = (A, B) is a two party protocol for computing a function f with an insecure minor of: f (x
We construct a bit commitment scheme = (S, R) as follows.
• Proof The completeness of is immediate. The hiding of also follows immediately from the security of for Alice (and the fact that the receiver is honestly executing the protocol as well).
In the following we prove the semi-honest binding of . Suppose for sake of contradiction that with probability ε > 1/ poly(n) over the choice of r S , r R , it holds that using both inputs b ∈ {0, 1} leads to the same transcript:
This event which we denote by E can be efficiently verified to hold by the sender (who is emulating the execution of Alice). Now suppose, in a different game, the receiver emulates the execution of B(y 2 ) instead of B(y 1 ) . In this case, by the security of the protocol for Bob, the event E should happen with probability at least ε = ε − negl(n) > 1/ poly(n), or otherwise Alice can distinguish Bob's inputs by using either of the inputs {x 1 , x 2 }, executing the protocol with Bob, and checking wether the event E holds or not. This contradicts the completeness of the protocol , because with non-negligible probability ε , both inputs x 1 , x 2 lead to the same exact transcripts and therefore the same outputs for Bob, but with 1 − negl(n) probability the outputs should be different.
Before proving Theorem 5.6 we show that the commitment messages have enough min-entropy. Proof The proof is similar to that of Lemma 5.3.
Suppose on the contrary that with probability 1/ poly(n) over the choice of the receiver's randomness r R , there is a message b ∈ {0, 1} and a transcript c such that P[c b = c ] ≥ 1/ poly(n). Then one can break the semi-honest security of with advantage ≥ 1/ poly(n) as follows. Given the transcript c ← c b , the semi-honest receiver adversary R = (R 1 , R 2 ) obtains c 0 by running the honest sender's protocol (with fresh randomness) against the same randomness r R of the receiver R 1 . The receiver R 2 outputs outputs 0 iff c 0 = c.
The attack succeeds with advantage ≥ 1/ poly(n) because of the following. If the sender chooses b = 1, then by the security of against semi-honest senders the probability that c 1 = c is only negl(n), and therefore the probability of adversary outputting 0 is negl(n). On the other hand, if the sender chooses b = 1, with probability ≥ 1/ poly(n) the two transcripts of for b = 0 will be equal to c . This means that the bit output by the adversary will indeed distinguish between the two committed bits.
Finally we will prove Theorem 5.6 using Lemma 5.10 and Lemma 4.3.
Proof of Theorem 5.6
By the reduction of Construction 5.8 and Theorem 5.9 it is sufficient to rule out "tamper-resilient" semi-honest commitments where tamper-resilient semi-honest commitments are naturally defined by requiring semi-honest binding and hiding properties to hold even if a party performs an (1/poly(n))-tampering attack to randomness of the other party.
For a fixed r R let f b (r S ) be the transcript of the scheme where sender uses (b, r S ) and the receiver uses r R . By Lemma 5.10, the entropy of the transcript will be t ≥ ω(n). Remark 5.11 Our tampering attacks against encryption, commitment, and secure computation schemes described in subsections above all use a single invocation of the computational splitting algorithm of Lemma 1.8. Therefore, if the tampering model allows the tampering attacker to tamper with a single uniformly selected bit of randomness, the tampering attack has the extra property that the tampered random bits remain completely random! Therefore, no statistical test on the tampered random bits could reveal the fact that they are tampered with.
Impossibility of Tamper-Resilient Zero-Knowledge for NP
In this section we show that no interactive proof system (with an efficient prover) for languages in NP \ BPP can be zero-knowledge against a tampering verifier. For simplicity, in the following we assume that the prover's randomness and the common input are both of length n (otherwise we pad the shorter one). First we give an explicit definition for tamper-resilient zero-knowledge.
Definition 5.12 (Tamper-Resilient
Zero-Knowledge) Suppose (P, V ) is an interactive proof system for language L where x (of length n) is the common input and y ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) is prover's private input. A p-tampering verifier V * at the beginning of the interaction generates a tampering circuit T that gets y as auxiliary input and transforms the uniform source of private randomness U n of the prover into a ptampering source U T, p n . We call such proof system α-tamper-resilient zero-knowledge against p-tampering, if for every p-tampering PPT verifier V * , there exists a simulator Sim such for every sequence of triples (x, y, z) of: the common input x, prover's private input y, the following two ensembles are α(|x|)-indistinguishable:
Remark 5.13 Note that in the definition above we did not give auxiliary input to the verifier, even though such definitions are standard. However, an auxiliary input zero knowledge is indeed a stronger form of zero knowledge, and the fact that our main result about zero knowledge if negative it only makes our result stronger. We also chose to simulate the output of the malicious verifier rather than its view, but these two are well-known to be equivalent. Comparison to the setting of [14] As noted in the introduction, we cannot simply follow the footsteps of [14] and use our computational splitting lemma (Lemma 4.3) to derive Theorem 5.14 above because of how the definition of zero-knowledge proofs conceptually differs between the computationally efficient and information theoretic (imperfect) sources of randomness. The difference is that in [14] the simulation is universal and should handle all the (bad) sources of randomness (with high minentropy of certain forms), while here the simulator implicitly knows the bad source of randomness because it can access the code of the malicious verifier.
In the rest of this section we will prove Theorem 5.14. At a high level, the proof is as follows.
Intuition Consider a fixed input x and a fixed verifier randomness r V . Then either of the following holds:
1. If the prover is (almost) deterministic, we show how to use the simulator of the zeroknowledge protocol to decide whether x ∈ L or not with non-negligible advantage. The proof of this step improves upon a result by Goldreich and Oren [23] who showed that the min-entropy of τ is positive. 2. If the prover is using sufficient randomness in the transcript to convey the proof in zero-knowledge manner: We show that in this case the messages of the system (now generated by the prover, since r V is already fixed) have min-entropy at least ω(log n). Relying on the high min-entropy of the messages and using ideas behind the proof of Lemma 4.3 we still show the existence of a tampering verifier who can learn nontrivial information about any of the bits of the witness by applying a Boolean function f to the transcript τ generated by a tampered r S . Since the view of such tampering verifier should be simulated by the efficient simulator Sim(·), by running Sim(x) enough number of times we can learn y i for every i and reconstruct y completely.
We start by formally describing our extension of the result of Goldreich and Oren [23] , which corresponds to the first step above. Note that here we only rely on the zero-knowledge property of the proof system (regardless of the tampering).
Theorem 5.15 (Message-Entropy of Zero-Knowledge Proofs) Suppose (P, V ) is an interactive proof system for a language L with negligible completeness and soundness errors. Then there is a PPT algorithm A such that the following properties hold.
• A takes as input x and 1 K and runs in time poly(|x|, K ).
• If A accepts x, it implies x ∈ L up to negl(n) error:
• Suppose in addition that (P, V ) is zero-knowledge, then either of the following holds for x ∈ L: 1. A(1 K , x) accepts x with probability at least 1/ poly(K , n), or 2. with probability 1 − 1/K over the choice of r V , it holds that the min-entropy of the transcript τ = V, P (x) conditioned on r V is at least:
Interpretation Theorem 5.15 implies that if the entropy of the messages coming from the prover in a zero-knowledge protocol is O(log n), then by taking K = poly(n) large enough A (1 k , x) can decide x ∈ L with 1/ poly(n) advantage (i.e., it accepts x ∈ L with 1/ poly(n) probability and accepts any x / ∈ L with negl(n) probability). This improves over the result of Goldreich and Oren [23] that obtained the same conclusion based on assumption that the prover is deterministic.
The following theorem corresponds to the second step of the proof of Theorem 5.14.
Theorem 5.16 (Signaling the Witness Bits) Suppose (P, V ) is an efficient-prover o( p)-tamper-resilient zero-knowledge proof system against p-tampering adversaries for a language L and p = 1/ poly(n). There exists an efficient algorithm B p such that the following holds for all x ∈ L: If with probability 1−1/K over the choice of r V , the min-entropy of the transcript
, then with probability 1 − negl(n) the output of B p is a valid witness y for x ∈ L.
Proof of Theorem 5.14 We first prove Theorem 5.14 using Theorems 5.15 and 5.16. We present an efficient algorithm C that decides membership of x ∈ L for the language L ∈ NP in probabilistic polynomial time by relying on the existence of the efficient algorithms A and B of Theorems 5.15 and 5.16.
Algorithm C p (x)
1. Take K = ω(1/ p 2 ) to be some poly(n) (which is possible since p = 1/ poly(n)).
Run algorithm B p (x)
to get some NP-witness y. Output x ∈ L if y is an acceptable witness. 3. Otherwise, run the algorithm A(1 K , x) and output whatever A decides about x ∈ L.
Soundness of C We first show that if x /
∈ L, C accepts x with negl(n) probability. The reason is that since we verify the extracted "witness" y. Therefore if x / ∈ L, no such witness can exist and pass the verification and so we would not accept x in Step 2. On the other hand, Theorem 5.15 asserts that the probability that if x / ∈ L, the algorithm A accept x with negligible probability.
Completeness of C There are two possibilities.
1. First suppose that with probability 1 − 1/K over the choice of r V , the min-entropy of the transcript τ = V, P (x) conditioned on r V is at least:
In this case, the algorithm B will extract the witness with probability 1 − negl(n) and so C accepts x with probability 1 − negl(n). 2. Otherwise, by the properties of the algorithm A specified in Theorem 5.15, x will be accepted with probability at least 1/ poly(n, K ) ≥ 1/ poly(n).
In the following we will prove Theorems 5.15 and 5.16.
Proof of Theorem 5.15
Our proof, at a high level, follows the approach of Goldreich and Oren [23] , who showed that zero-knowledge with deterministic provers is impossible unless L ∈ BPP. Namely, one starts by assuming that the prover is deterministic for all x ∈ L and derive L ∈ BPP. In our Theorem 5.15, however, we conclude an instance-dependent statement; namely, for every x ∈ L, either there is "sufficient" entropy in the messages, or that we can decide the membership of x in L efficiently. Below, first, we give a comparison between the approach of [23] and our approach for the weaker claim (than Theorem 5.15) that the entropy of the prover messages in case of x ∈ L cannot always be O(log n). Then will then prove Theorem 5.15 formally.
The Approach of [23] Suppose the prover is deterministic. This means that for every prefix of the transcript of the interaction between the prover and the verifier p 1 , v 1 , . . . , p i−1 , v i−1 , the next message p i of the prover is determined. This fact can be used, together with the existence of the simulator Sim, to efficiently generate an accepting transcript τ whenever x ∈ L, in a way that the same procedure does not generate an accepting transcript whenever x / ∈ L. The main ideas of [23] to obtain both properties simultaneously are as follows: 1. At a high level, in the process of generating τ we are executing the verifier V against some fixed (simulated) prover strategy P * . This way, the soundness condition guarantees that this will not lead to an accept for x / ∈ L unless with negligible probability. 2. The (simulated) prover P * needs to behave close to the honest prover if x ∈ L to generate an accepting τ . For this, we use the simulator Sim to get the prover messages p i one by one. To get the i'th message p i , we use the simulator over a verifier who knows the previously generated partial transcript p 1 , v 1 , . . . , p i−1 as auxiliary input, and sends v i−1 as the next answer according to the algorithm of the honest verifier. This way the value p i will be indeed the same as the actual p i (that the honest prover would return) with 1 − negl(n) probability, or otherwise these two answers would be distinguishable which contradicts the zero-knowledge property (note that p i is fixed can be known to the distinguishing circuit).
The Extensions When the prover is randomized, we cannot conclude that the generated message p i is necessarily the same as p i with high probability because the prover's messages (even conditioned on the previous messages p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p i−1 ) could be different in every new execution of the protocol against the same fixed honest verifier. Thus, instead we follow the following approach.
How to Generate Messages
Instead of executing the simulator once for getting every message p i+1 , we repeatedly execute the simulator Sim up to some poly(n) times till we get the same the partial transcript ( p 1 , v 1 . . . , p i−1 , v i ) as generated previously, and only then we look at the simulated value p i (which we hope to be the same as p i with good probability). 2. Analysis The challenging part is to show that if there is at least one transcript τ = ( p 1 , v 1 , . . . , p m , v m ) that appears with α ≥ 1/ poly(n) probability, then we will generate τ through the process above with non-negligible probability. A naive analysis would use the fact that in every step, the provability of obtaining p i is at least β i > α > 1/ poly(n). This simple analysis does not work because (1/ poly(n)) poly(n) could be negligible (but note that this analysis in fact works for constant number of rounds because (1/ poly(n)) O(1) ≥ 1/ poly(n)). For arbitrary polynomial number of rounds we need a sharper analysis to show that if we obtain p i with probability β i , the product β i is also non-negligible. We do so by decomposing α into α = α 1 · α 2 . . . where α i is the probability of p i being the honest message conditioned on the previously generated transcript. We show that for every i, β i /α i ≈ 1 + ε for arbitrary small ε = 1/ poly(n) and thus
The Formal Proof Let τ = Q(x, r V ) be the random variable denoting the transcript of the protocol when the common input is x, and the verifier has random coins fixed to r V . Since the verifier acts deterministically once x and r V are fixed, the distribution of Q is a deterministic function of the random coins of the prover. For an implicitly fixed r V , we further let Q i (x, τ i−1 ) denote the distribution of the message sent by the prover in the ith round, given that τ i−1 = p 1 , v 1 , . . . , p i−1 , v i−1 is the set of messages exchanged in the previous rounds.
In the following we assume that the proof system (P, V ) has m rounds.
Observe that the message sent by the verifier in the ith round is a (poly-time computable) deterministic function f of x, r V , and the messages sent by the prover in the previous rounds. We can use this fact to write Q in terms of Q i , as follows. Let τ = p 1 , v 1 , . . . , p m , v m be a transcript of the protocol consistent with x and r V . Then, assuming that τ i is the partial transcript up to and including round i, it holds that:
Our algorithm A will be such that for K = poly(n) and x ∈ L, if for a 1/K fraction of r V , the min-entropy of Q(x, r V ) is ≤ log K , then A(1 K , x) will output "accept" with probability ≥ 1 /16K 2 .
Suppose for a 1/K fraction of r V , there is some corresponding "heavy" message transcript τ * = τ * (x, r V ) that occurs with probability ≥ 1/K ; we call such r V special.
Our approach will be to produce an efficient prover strategy P * that, when interacting with V on x with such a special r V , will produce the corresponding τ * as its transcript with probability ≥ 1 /8K (without knowing r V and τ * in advance).
First, assuming that we have such a prover strategy P * , we claim that we can use P * to create the required A. We observe that for fixed x ∈ S (of large enough length n = |x|), not more than 1 /2 fraction of the special r V can have their corresponding τ * to be a rejecting transcript, because otherwise the honest verifier will reject on common input x with probability 1 /2K > negl(n), violating the 1 − negl(n) completeness. Thus a uniformly chosen r V will be both special and have an accepting τ * with probability
Now we examine what will happen when we simulate (P * , V ) on common input x ∈ S, with a uniformly chosen r V . With probability > 1 /2K , the random coins of V will have a corresponding τ * that is an accepting transcript, and conditioned on getting such an r V , the output of (P * , V ) will be τ * with probability ≥ 1 /8K . Thus, with probability ≥ 1 /16K 2 , (P * , V ) will be accepting. Further, notice that when the common input is x / ∈ L, then the output of (P * , V ) can be accepting with probability at most negl(n), or otherwise the 1 − negl(n) soundness would be violated. Therefore, we can simply define A to be the machine simulating (P * , V ) on common input x.
It remains to show how to construct P * . Define V * to be the verifier strategy that takes a partial message transcript as its auxiliary input z, sends its first messages according to z, and then aborts. By the auxiliary input zero-knowledge, there exists an efficient simulator S for V * .
The malicious prover P * (defined based on S), over the common input x, works as follows.
1. Letτ = ∅. 
Assuming that the randomness of the verifier, r V , is special, ideally we want that in each iteration i, P * sends the ith prover message such that it matches τ * for x and r V of the verifier it is interacting with.
To actually analyze the behavior of P * , let assume that P * and V have each sent all messages correctly corresponding to τ * for all iterations up to the tth iteration (i.e., τ = τ * t−1 ). We will calculate the probability that P * then sends p * t on the tth iteration. Then, since V acts deterministically given x, r V and the prover messages, V will also send v * t on this iteration. Our analysis will initially assume that we have access to an oracle simulator O(x, z), that produces transcripts identically distributed to a real interaction between (P, V * ). We will estimate the success probability for each iteration when we are using this oracle. Then, we will argue that replacing the oracle O with our computationally indistinguishable simulator S gives at most a negligible loss.
Using the Ideal Oracle
We now give the analysis when we use O. First we analyze the probability that our oracle simulator finds a transcript matching the messages sent so far. Since the verifier V * will send messages according to its auxiliary input, the verifier messages up to step t will always match v * i (after this, V * will abort, but it turns out we don't care about the (t + 1)th and later messages in this transcript). So we only need to find the probability that the transcript has matching prover messages. Since O is a perfect simulator oracle, the first t −1 prover messages of O(x, τ * t−1 ) will be distributed exactly as the random variables Q i for i ≤ t − 1. Thus the probability that a transcript produced by O(x, τ * t−1 ) matches the first t −1 messages of τ * is given by
Thus, repeating K (log K ) times will give us a probability ≥ 1 − (1 − 1/K ) K (log K ) of producing a matching transcript, which is ≥ 1 − 1/K . Given that we have produced a matching transcript, the probability that the tth message of this transcript is p * t is given by
. Therefore the overall probability that P * using O sends p * t in the tth iteration, given that it sent the correct messages in the previous iterations, is ( 
Using the Simulator Now we replace the ideal oracle O by using the simulator S. We argue that P * using S must succeed with probability at least
. Otherwise, we can create a distinguisher D to distinguish between View V * P, V * (τ * t−1 ) (x) and S(x, τ * t−1 ) as follows: Simulate the tth iteration of P * and outputs 1 whenever the message sent is m * i (where 1 corresponds to guessing that the distribution is
contradicting the fact that the protocol is zero-knowledge. Finally note that the probability that every message sent by P * using S matches τ * is at least:
The last inequality holds for large enough
Proof of Theorem 5.16 In the following we use {−1, +1} (instead of {0, 1}) to represent the bits of the witness y. In what follows we will describe a malicious verifier V * i which is indexed by i ≤ poly(n). We will show how to use a simulator for the o( p)-tamper-resilient zero knowledge to obtain an efficient way to guess y i with overwhelming probability where y i is the i'th bit of the witness given to the prover. Then, by enumerating i we can construct all of y with high probability.
The description of tampering verifier V * i The verifier V * i starts by choosing r V at random as the randomness of the verifier. Then it runs the attacker of Lemma 4.3 to obtain (f, T) for the following two functions f 0 , f 1 . The function f b takes prover's randomness as input and outputs the transcript τ of the interaction of the verifier (with randomness r V ) with the prover (with the designated randomness) using witness y b where y is the same as y except possibly on the i'th bit in which y b is fixed to be b. In other words, it is as if the prover will flip the i'th bit of y if it is not b and then interacts with the verifier using a randomness r P (which is the input) and then the transcript denotes the output of f b . After sampling ( f, T ) ← (f, T) from the corresponding distribution of Lemma 4.3 for functions f 0 , f 1 described above V * i sends T as the p-tampering circuit to tamper with prover's randomness, and outputs f (τ ) as its final output bit. Using simulator of V * i to reveal y i Since the output of V * i is just one bit, the simulator should indeed simulate this bit statistically well. This means that the simulator Sim for V * i gets x as input and generates an output bit that distinguishes which bit b the i'th bit of the witness y i is taking, and reveals this value by advantage ( p). Therefore, the output bit of simulator (executed over x) could be used to guess y i with probability 1/2 + ( p). By repeating the execution of the simulator and taking majority one can obtain y i with probability 1 − negl(n).
Output of V
p) − √ 1/K = ( p) − o( p) = ( p).
Achieving Tamper Resilience Using Pseudorandomness
We present our positive results on tamper-resilient cryptography in this section. We show that assuming the existence of pseudorandom generators (PRGs), which is implied by the existence of one-way functions [26] , a wide range of cryptographic primitives, including signatures, identification schemes, witness-hiding protocols, as well as encryption schemes with a "weak" notion of semantic security (see Definition 6.9) can be made resilient to p-tampering for p = n −α , where n is the security parameter and α > 0 is an arbitrary constant. Our construction can be extended in a straightforward way to achieve resilience to p-tampering with p = log −c (n) for some constant c, assuming the existence of PRGs with sub-exponential security.
Using Pseudorandomness with Short Seeds. We obtain our positive results by a generic transformation that converts a secure implementation P of a primitive P to one that is secure even in the presence of p-tampering attacks. Our transformation is in fact very simple: given an implementation P with standard security, we convert it to P that generates a short random seed x with length s ≤ 1/ p, and then uses a PRG G : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} poly(n) to generate a pseudorandom string G(x). Finally, it emulates P with G(x) as the randomness. Note that by doing so, P only needs to use s random bits to generate a seed x for G, and so, on average, only 1 bit of the randomness gets tampered with during the p-tampering attack.
First note that when we use the PRG G over a seed s of length 1/ p and use G(s) instead of the truly random bits, the scheme P (typically) remains secure if P was originally secure due to the pseudorandomness of G(s). 7 Also, since the minentropy of the tampered s is at least lg[((1 + p)/2) 1/ p ], any event E involving a system that executes P, would happen with a tampered s with probability at most ε ·((1+ p)/2) 1/ p /2 1/ p < ε·e where ε is the probability of E happening in the original (un-tampered) game. Therefore, if originally we had ε = negl(n), the probability of adversary winning remains negligible eε = negl(n).
Our transformation applies to natural primitives with a security game that can be captured by a "threshold-t falsifiable game" with t = 0. A threshold-t falsifiable game is simply a game between an efficient challenger C and an adversary A such that C outputs accept or reject after the interaction with A, and the game is secure if for every efficient adversary A, C outputs accept with probability at most t (n) + negl(n). Threshold-0 falsifiable games, in general, capture primitives with security defined as hardness of searching secrets. As mentioned, this includes signature schemes, witnesshiding protocols, and identification schemes.
Our result about tamper-resilient identification schemes might seem skeptical at first because most known identification schemes are based on zero-knowledge protocols, and we have demonstrated earlier that zero-knowledge is impossible in the presence of tampering. However, tamper-resilient identification schemes are still possible to obtain because identification schemes only rely on the weaker property of witness hiding (as opposed to zero-knowledge property), and in this section we show that the witness hiding property can be preserved under tampering.
Beyond Threshold-0 Primitives. The above mentioned idea of using pseudorandomness can only be applied to threshold-0 primitives since it relies on the fact that adversary's original winning probability is at most negligible. We also show how to obtain tamper-resilient implementations of cryptographic primitives even when the security game is not threshold-0, but here we assume the number of honest parties to be at least 2. This result, on a high level, is obtained by one honest party Alice helping the other honest party Bob extract pure randomness from its tampered randomness X B . To do this, Alice sends random string X A (which might also be a tampered string) to Bob, and Bob applies a two-source extractor to get pure randomness R B = Ext( X A , X B ). In case X A is sent over a public channel observed by the adversary, we would need a strong two-source extractor [13] such that R B remains uniformly random even conditioned on the value of X A . This idea can be applied to obtain private truly random seeds where we have two conditions: (1) p < √ 2 − 1; this is required to guarantee that each of X A , X B have sufficient min-entropy required by the known two-source extractors, and that (2) the honest parties know the set of honest parties. For the more general case of any constant p < 1, and where the (at least two) honest parties do not know each other, we rely on the network extractor paradigm of [31] to obtain private pseudorandom seeds under (non-standard) computational assumptions.
In the following subsections we present our positive results in more details.
Tamper Resilient Signatures
As a concrete example, we will first show how to achieve tampering resilient signatures. The arguments for the other primitives will be indeed similar.
Definition 6.1 (Many-Time Signatures)
A many-time signature scheme P = (Gen, Sign, Ver) is secure if every PPT adversary A wins in the following game = (A, C) with negligible probability:
• C executes Gen(1 n ) to generate signing key sk and verification key vk, and sends vk to A. We say that any A breaks the security of P if he wins with non-negligible probability.
Recall that, assuming the existence of OWFs, we know how to create many-time secure signature schemes that are deterministic in their signing and verification phases. In fact, any many-time signature scheme that uses randomness in the signing phase can be converted into one that is deterministic, by using PRFs. This could be done by generating the seed for the PRF in the key-generation phase, and adding it as part of the secret key. Then, whenever a message m is to be signed, we apply the PRF to m, and use the result as the randomness needed to sign.
The definition of p-tamper-resilient signatures follows from Definition 6.1 and asserting that the security holds against p-tampering adversaries. Proof Let P = (Gen, Sign, Ver) be a secure signature scheme. W.l.o.g., we assume that P is deterministic except in Gen. Suppose further that Gen(1 n ) uses m(n) bits of randomness. Let G : {0, 1} s → {0, 1} m(n) be a pseudorandom generator with s = O(n α ). (Recall that secure signature schemes imply OWFs [27] , which imply PRGs with arbitrary polynomial length output.) We define P = (Gen, Sign, Ver), where Gen(1 n ) works as follows: Gen generates a random seed X of length s = n α , and then computes r = G(X ). It then emulates Gen using r as random coins. In the following by we refer to the new scheme and by C we refer to the new challenger of the multi-message security game of .
Roughly speaking, Theorem 6.3 is proved by observing that (1) P remains secure even if the randomness of P is generated from the pseudorandom source G(X ), and (2) after tampering, the seed X used by P still has s − O(1) bits of min-entropy.
The Formal Proof Suppose that there exists an efficient adversary A that breaks the scheme by winning the game against C with non-negligible probability. Namely, there exists a non-negligible ε such that for infinitely many n,
By an averaging argument and fixing coins of A, we can assume w.l.o.g. that A is deterministic and thus the tampering circuit Tam 
Note that since U Tam s is a p-tampering source over s = 1/ p bits, it has min-entropy s − log e. This can be seen by observing that for every r ∈ {0, 1} s , P[U Tam
This means that if we use the randomness U s rather than U Tam s the probability of any event would decrease at most by a factor of e. Namely, A is a successful attacker breaking the scheme with probability ε(n)/e > 1/ poly(n). But, this contradicts the security of the scheme P and completes the proof of Theorem 6.3.
Our proofs of security for identification schemes and witness hiding protocols follow the same lines as those of our result about signature schemes. Thus we will only discuss the specific modifications we make in each case.
Identification Schemes
An identification scheme is a protocol that allows Alice to prove her identity to Charlie, and a malicious Bob cannot impersonate Alice even if he gets to see Alice proving her identity polynomially many times. Each identity can be represented by some α ∈ {0, 1} n and there exists a "public-file" that couples every identity α by some secretly generated public information I (s, α). The secret s (which is chosen at random) is given to the person with identity α. The public record (α, I (s, α)) will be accessed by both the "prover" (of the identity) and the "verifier" during the identification process.
Definition 6.4 An identification scheme
= (I, P, V ) has three efficient components: The algorithm I takes as input (α ∈ {0, 1} n , s ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) ) and outputs v ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) and (P, V ) form an interactive proof system. We also demand the following properties.
• Completeness P[ P(s), V (α, I (s, α)) = 1] = 1 holds for every α ∈ {0, 1} n , s ∈ {0, 1} poly(n) .
• Soundness For every α ∈ {0, 1} n , every poly(n)-sized (non-uniform) interactive adversary A wins in the following game with negl(n) probability. 1. For s ← {0, 1} poly(n) , A interacts with P(s) polynomially many times (bounded by the running time of A) 2. Then A (while keeping its internal state) interacts with V on common input (α, I (s, α) ).
A wins if V accepts the interaction.
Remark 6.5 (Identification from Signatures) Many-times secure signature schemes can be used to obtain identification schemes as follows. The information generation algorithm I , for every identity α generates a pair of signing key s and verification key v. (Note that the signing key can always be assumed to be a uniformly sampled string.) The verifier V , given the public record (α, v) sends a uniformly chosen random message m to P who signs m using the signing key s, and sends the signature σ back to V . Finally V accepts if σ is a valid signature of m. It is easy to see that the many-time security of the signature scheme implies the soundness of the constructed identification scheme. Further, if the signature scheme has a deterministic Sign algorithm, then the identification scheme has a deterministic prover P (but the verifier is randomized).
Although secure signature schemes imply secure identification schemes according to Remark 6.5, this transformation does not preserve the tamper resilience by definition. The reason is that, even though it is known that there are signature schemes with deterministic verification, this identification scheme uses some extra randomness which could also be tampered with by the adversary. Proof The existence of a secure identification scheme implies the existence of OWFs [27] , which in turn implies the existence of a secure signature scheme with a deterministic signing algorithm. The signature scheme can be used to obtain an identification scheme with a deterministic prover P according to the construction described in Remark 6.5.
Since the prover P in the obtained identification scheme is deterministic, the adversary A can only usefully tamper with the randomness of the information generation algorithm I and the verifier V . I uses its randomness in the initial generation phase, and V uses its randomness in the final verification phase. Since in the security game of there is only a single verification performed, the number of random bits needed for the information generation and the final verification is an a priori fixed polynomial. Therefore, we can apply the same idea that we used to make signature schemes tamper resilient. Namely, we modify I and V both so that each of them uses only a short random seed of length O(1/ p) and applies a PRG to expand it to the right size poly(n). The proof of tamper-resilience of the new scheme is identical to that of Theorem 6.3.
Witness Hiding Protocols
Definition 6.7 (Witness Hiding Protocols) Suppose R is an NP relation. Namely, there is an efficient algorithm that accepts (x, w) when |w| = poly(|x|) iff (x, w) ∈ R. Suppose Gen is a randomized sampling procedure that given 1 n (and enough random bits) runs in time poly(n) and outputs some (x, w) of length |x| = n. A proof system (P, V ) for the relation R is one-time witness hiding w.r.t. the sampling procedure Gen if, for all PPT adversaries A, A wins in the following game with negligible probability:
Theorem 6.8 Any (q-times) witness hiding protocol (P, V ) for some relation R can be converted into a stateless (q-times) p-tamper-resilient witness-hiding protocol, with p = n −α , for any constant α > 0. Achieving p-tamper resilience witness-hiding (with unbounded number of repetitions) is also possible assuming that the prover is allowed to keep internal state between repetitions.
Proof First note that any witness hiding protocol implies the existence of one-way functions as follows: Given input r , use r as randomness and using Gen(·) sample (x, w) ∈ R and output x = f (r ). Inverting f (r ) for a random r implies breaking the witness hiding of the corresponding protocol even without participating in the interactive phase. Again, we can again use the existence of OWFs to get PRGs [26] .
To achieve tamper resilience under a single execution of the interactive proof we can use the same exact trick as we did for signature schemes: Gen uses a "short" random seed s of length 1/ p, and applies a PRG to make it of sufficiently long to run Gen. The prover also does the same thing; i.e., it tosses 1/ p many coins and expands them to the right length using a PRG. In the following we focus on the case of sequential repetition.
A Priori Bounded Number of Repetitions
If the number of sequential repetitions is an a priori bounded polynomial q = poly(n), then we can still take the same approach as that of the single-repetition case. Namely, one can think of the security game with a fixed number q = poly(n) of repetitions as a game with a fixed time-complexity that needs a fixed = poly(n) number of random bits used by the challenger C = (Gen, P 1 , P 2 , . . . , P q ). Thus, by using a PRG we can expand an initial 1/ p number of true random bits to bits and apply the same analysis.
Unbounded Number of Repetitions At first sight, it seems that our general technique of using PRGs does not work if we go through an unbounded number of repetitions (i.e., a polynomial that is chosen by the adversary To analyze the tamper resilience of the scheme above, we apply the same analysis presented for the previous cases. All we have to do additionally is to first fix the adversary, which fixes the number of its sequential repetitions, and then apply the same analysis as before. This was not previously needed because, e.g., in case of signatures, even though the adversary's complexity was not fixed before the analysis, we had an upper-bound on the number of random bits needed by the challenger, but here we get this upper-bound after fixing the adversary's running time.
Weak Semantic Security
Here we present the following new definition as a relaxation of the semantic security and prove our positive result about the possibility of tamper resilient encryption under this relaxed definition. The probabilities above are also over the generation of the encryption key. Note that (Gen, Enc, Dec) is semantically-secure if it is 1-weakly semantically secure.
Definition 6.10 (Tamper Resilient Weakly Semantically Secure Encryption)
We call an encryption scheme tamper-resilient weakly semantically secure if for every p = 1/ poly(n) (where n is the security parameter) is secure under Definition 6.9 even when the adversary Adv is able to generate a p-tampering circuit Tam that modifies the randomness of the key generation and encryption algorithms into ptampering sources.
We prove the following positive result about the possibility of achieving weakly semantically secure encryptions under Definition 6.9. Our result implies that when we consider the weak semantic security according to Definition 6.9 for functions f (m) which cannot be computed by more than negl(n) probability given the encryption of m, one can always preserve this property (of f remaining "hard" to compute given the encryptions) even in the presence of p-tampering attacks for any p = 1/ poly(n). Proof We follow the same paradigm of previous sections but with even smaller PRG seeds. The existence of any semantically secure encryption scheme implies the existence of OWFs, which in turn implies the existence of PRGs with arbitrary polynomial stretch [26] . Thus, for every constant γ > 0 we can use two seeds of length n γ /2 to get enough number of pseudorandom bits to use in Gen and Enc. To get the (1 + O(n −β )) weakly semantically secure scheme (Gen , Enc , Dec) we set γ = α − β and then modify the Gen and Enc algorithms (and call them Gen , Enc ) to use a truly random seed of length n γ /2 and stretch it to the necessary number of bits.
First we claim that if (Gen, Enc, Dec) was semantically secure, (Gen , Enc , Dec) remains semantically secure. This is nontrivial because the distribution X is not necessarily efficiently samplable and f, I are not necessarily efficiently computable. We use the classical result of [22] that a public key scheme is semantically secure iff it is CPA secure. A CPA secure is defined based on a security game in which the adversary, given the public key, chooses two messages m 0 , m 1 , receives the encryption of m b for b ← {0, 1} and wins if he guesses b correctly with probability 1/2 + 1/ poly(n). It is easy to see that the CPA property is preserved when we use pseudorandom bits in Gen, because otherwise the security game itself can be turned into a distinguisher against the PRG that is used to expand the pseudorandom bits used in Gen.
Now we study the security of (Gen , Enc , Dec) in the presence of n −α -tampering attacks. During a n −α -tampering attack, every bits of the PRG seed of length n γ (applied to two seeds of length n γ /2) is tampered with by the adversary only with probability n −α . Therefore, the probability of any seed being the result of the tampering is at most (1 + n −α /2) n γ ≤ e n −β /2 n γ . Similarly to the argument in the analysis of the tamper-resilient signatures, we conclude that any event E which an efficient adversary could make it happen without the tampering, would happen now (with the tampering) with probability at most
We conclude Theorem 6.11 by considering the event E to be the event that the adversary is computing f (m) correctly. In the original semantically secure scheme it holds that 
Generalization to Threshold-0 Primitives
Our tamper-resilient constructions for Signatures, Identification Schemes, WeaklySemantically Secure Encryptions, etc, above clearly suggest a general approach that can be applied to a wide range of primitives where the adversary's job is to make the challenger accept with non-negligible probability. Here we describe the abstract properties of the primitives that makes this approach applicable. Any natural cryptographic primitive P can be viewed as a set of interactive algorithms with some completeness properties imposed on them. For example an encryption scheme has three components of (Gen, Enc, Dec). In the security game of P some of these components are executed on the "challenger" side and their randomness is prone to online tampering. There might be several "instantiations" of each of these components by the challenger during its interaction with the adversary. For example in the security game of multi-message signatures, the signing algorithm might be executed an unbounded polynomial number of times depending on adversary's choice. If an executed component can keep internal state across different instantiations, we still consider this a single instantiation. For example, when a tampering verifier interacts with a prover sequentially in poly(n) repetitions while the prover keeps an internal state (as it was the case in witness-hiding protocols in Sect. 6.3), we consider this a single instantiation.
In order to apply the pseudorandomness-based approach of previous sections to a primitive and make its implementation resilient to p tampering for p = 1/ poly(n), it is sufficient to have both of the following two conditions: 1. The threshold of the security game is 0 (i.e., adversary needs to with with 1/ poly(n)). 2. The number of randomized components of the primitive P which are instantiated during the security game are at most n −β for a constant β < α where p = n −α . When we have the above two conditions, all we have to do is to use pseudorandomness to execute the components of P as follows: each component uses a seed s of length n γ as the key to a PRF g where γ = α − β and uses g s (1), g s (2) , . . . to get its "random" bits during its execution. Note that, for any fixed polynomial t, the sequence [g s (1) , g s (2), . . . , g s (t)] is pseudorandom. So after fixing the complexity of the adversary Adv who interacts with the challenger, each instantiated component of P is using a PRG that stretches a seed s of length n γ to the needed number of random bits. Each of these seeds could be p-tampered with by the adversary in an instantiation during the security game, and so their joint min-entropy loss (compared to a truly random seed) is at most O(n β · n γ · n −α ) = O(1). Therefore, any event E that the original (non-tampering) adversary could make it happen with probability ρ, will happen in the security game with the tampering attack with probability at most 2 O(1) ρ, which remains negl(n) assuming that ρ was already negligible.
Beyond Threshold-0 Primitives
Here we describe a general method that allows us to make a cryptographic primitive tamper-resilient to p-tampering attacks for any constant p < 1, as long as there are two honest parties involved in the primitive (that know each other). We start by describing a solution for the task of key agreement (which is a primitive in which both parties are honest and the adversary is a passive eavesdropper), and then describe how it can be generalized to more settings by relying the work of [31] at the cost of non-standard computational assumptions.
Tamper-Resilient Key Agreement
A tampering adversary attacking a key agreement protocol between Alice and Bob sends tampering circuits Tam A and Tam B to Alice and Bob where each tampering circuit tampers with the randomness of the corresponding party. In this section we prove the following theorem. Description of : Alice (resp. Bob) will send X 1 A (resp. X 1 B ) to the other party. Then Alice (resp. Bob) will apply the strong extractor of Lemma 6.13 and gets X A = Ext( X 2 A , X 1 B ) (resp. X B = Ext( X 2 B , X 1 A )). Then they use (X A , X B ) as their randomness and execute . Note that By taking n large enough, X A , X B would be long enough to execute .
Since the tampering circuits Tam A and Tam B cannot communicate, it follows that the random variables X 2 A and X 1 B are independent. Since, p < √ 2 − 1, the minentropy of the "source" X 2 A is at least α for α > 1/2 even conditioned on the publicly revealed message X 1 A , simply because X 2 A was tampered with after X 1 A . Therefore, the extracted X A will remain statistically close to a secret U m for m = (n) in eyes of the adversary, even conditioned on the information sent over the public channel. The same argument holds for the uniformity of X B . Thus, Alice and Bob can use the (statistically close to) pure random seeds X A , X B to run the protocol securely. 
